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ABSTRACT
While courts have created a doctrine of contributory
trademark infringement in response to the expansion of
goods and services from brick-and-mortar to the Internet,
the exact duties of web hosts under the rule are not yet
clear. Despite judicial attempts to carve out new standards
to define traditional requirements, the application of these
standards remains inconsistent and has left unresolved
ambiguities. The disparities between the standards may be
balanced through an analysis of the affirmative duties
imposed by the law on online service providers, as well as
a closer look at the relationship between a service provider
and user. This Article reexamines the meaning of
contributory liability for web hosts in light of their active
and passive roles in such relationships, and considers the
factors of good (and bad) faith in the conduct of
defendants, practicability of affirmative duties, and
inherent differences between types of online service
providers as potential deciding factors.
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INTRODUCTION
In the e-commerce realm, online service providers (“OSPs”)
continue to face potential liability for contributory trademark
infringement, given the prevalence and profitability of counterfeit
goods. As online accessibility to various markets for goods has
rapidly increased in the last couple decades, courts have
endeavored to stretch the scope of contributory infringement to fit
new situations while keeping a limit on the accompanying
expansion of property rights. Under the Lanham Act, a
contributory trademark infringement claim requires showing that
the defendant has “suppl[ied] its product or service to identified
individuals that it knows or has reason to know are engaging in
trademark infringement.”1 The elements of contributory trademark
infringement are codified to some degree within the statute, but as
of today, the doctrine remains a creature of common law, with
discretion largely allocated to the courts.2
The unique nature of the relationship between web hosts and
web users has presented certain complications in finding the
“correct” standard. The interpretation of the test for contributory
trademark infringement ultimately determines how much of the
burden OSPs and trademark owners respectively carry in
monitoring trademark infringement in online venues. Thus, a clear
formulation of the standard and how to account for real-world and
legal inconsistencies is necessary.
This Article attempts to define the present scope of online
contributory liability by reconciling conflicting standards presented
in the case law, focusing specifically on the “knowledge” and
“control” requirements in the context of relationships between
OSPs and users. Part I reviews the evolution of contributory
trademark infringement standards. Part II analyzes the nuanced
role(s) of the defendant web host under current judicial
1

Lanham Act § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1114(a) (2005).
Deborah F. Buckman, Liability as Vicarious or Contributory Infringer
under Lanham Act—Modern Cases, 152 A.L.R. FED. 573 (1999) (outlining
notable federal cases on secondary liability for trademark infringement).
2
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interpretations of the rule. Part III addresses remaining ambiguities
by identifying three main balancing factors: (a) limitations on
exclusive rights, (b) indications of a defendant’s good faith, and (c)
the specific nature of a defendant’s services.
I.

THE CHANGING ROLE OF OSPS IN TRADEMARK
INFRINGEMENT CASES

In intellectual property law, liability for contributory
infringement may extend to defendants even though they have not
themselves infringed the protected creation. The test for
contributory trademark infringement is harder to satisfy than its
counterparts in copyright and patent law.3 But the basic principles
are the same: if a plaintiff can support an underlying claim of
direct infringement by one party, he may further assign
contributory liability to a third party who has “knowingly
encourage[d] or facilitate[d] illegal and tortious activity.”4
The doctrine of contributory trademark infringement is overall
a judicial construction “derive[d] from the common law of torts.”5
In one of the earliest formulations of the standard, the Supreme
Court in William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co. held liable the
manufacturer of the pharmaceutical product “Quin-Coco,” whose
salesmen attempted to convince druggists that orders for the
product Coco-Quinine could be filled with Quin-Coco more
cheaply and without risking detection.6 The Court condemned the
unfair advantage gained from passing off one product as another. 7
However, it emphasized that “[o]ne who induces another to
commit a fraud and furnishes the means of consummating it is
equally guilty and liable for the injury.”8 Thus Eli Lilly introduced
the foundational elements of inducement and providing the means
3

See 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 25:17 (4th ed. 2014) (noting that various courts have inferred
this comparison from the Supreme Court’s discussion in Sony Corp. of America
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 n.19 (1984)).
4
Id.
5
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2010).
6
See William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526 (1924).
7
See id. at 532.
8
Id. at 530–31.
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to infringe in the context of unfair competition.
In Inwood Labs, Inc. v. Ives Labs, Inc., the Supreme Court first
laid out the test for contributory trademark infringement:
[I]f a manufacturer or distributer [sic] intentionally
induces another to infringe a trademark, or if it
continues to supply its product to one whom it
knows or has reason to know is engaging in
trademark infringement, the manufacturer or
distributor is contributorially responsible for any
harm done as a result of the deceit.9
Thus the two main factors under the Inwood standard are
inducement, or, alternatively, a knowledge standard of knowing or
having reason to know.
Originally framed to fit the manufacturer-distributor
relationship, the Inwood standard has since been adapted for other
types of relationships which possess the requisite inducement and
knowledge elements. In Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v.
Concession Services, Inc., the Seventh Circuit declared the
standard applicable to landlord-tenant and licensor-licensee
relationships,10 recognizing that a major issue was whether the
defendant flea market operator was in a position to suspect and
investigate the sale of counterfeit items on the premises.11 This
holding introduced the rule that where a third party passively
permits the infringing activities, “willful blindness” may support a
finding of actual knowledge for the purposes of contributory
liability. Similarly, in Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., the
Ninth Circuit extended the scope of Inwood to a swap meet
operator, noting that “[t]he Court in Inwood . . . laid down no
limiting principle that would require defendant to be a
manufacturer or distributor.”12 Beginning with these cases, courts
9

Inwood Labs, Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982).
Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d
1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1992).
11
See id. at 1152.
12
Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1996).
10
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expanded the application of Inwood to a new class of defendants:
service providers.13
Applying the Inwood standard to online service providers has
been more complicated. In Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network
Solutions, Inc., the Ninth Circuit modified the standard for
application to OSPs, adding a new requirement of monitoring or
control on the part of the OSP. Specifically, the plaintiff must
show “[d]irect control and monitoring of the instrumentality used
by a third party to infringe the plaintiff’s mark.”14 The court found
that a registrar of Internet domain names lacked such control over
the infringing use of domain names because the registering service
merely handled the registration process and did not itself supply
the domain name combinations.15
The Ninth Circuit continues to apply this modified Lockheed
standard to other types of OSPs, such as web hosts for sales of
goods16 or payment processing services.17
However, a number of courts including the Second Circuit and
district courts in the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have applied the
original Inwood formulation to OSPs in a variety of contexts:
online auction sites,18 websites that host online transactions for the
sale of goods,19 and providers of email addresses.20
13

See, e.g., Coach, Inc. v. Goodfellow, 717 F.3d 498, 503 (6th Cir. 2013)
(relying on Hard Rock Cafe and Fonovisa to apply Inwood to a service which
rented booths and storage units to vendors).
14
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 984
(9th Cir. 1999).
15
See id.
16
See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 658
F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that the Lockheed test of “direct control
and monitoring” applied where defendants provided a website-hosting service).
17
See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Intern. Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 807
(9th Cir. 2007) (applying Lockheed as an “extension” of Inwood to bank
associations which processed credit card payments to websites with infringing
material).
18
See, e.g., Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
19
See, e.g., Chloe SAS v. Sawabeh Info. Servs. Co., No. CV 11–04147
GAF (MANx), 2014 WL 4402218, at *6, *22 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2014) (finding
implied intent under the Inwood standard against online companies which
established a “haven” for counterfeiting of luxury brands).
20
See, e.g., W.W. Williams Co. v. Google, Inc., No. 2:13–cv–713, 2013
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To better understand the significance of this divergence, it is
important to examine the core elements of these standards.
II.

THE CONTEMPORARY ELEMENTS IN ACTION

To satisfy the Inwood standard, a plaintiff can show
inducement of the infringing activity or the defendant’s possession
of a requisite level of knowledge.21 Whereas the requirement of
“knowledge” targets OSPs which do no more than “turn a blind
eye” to infringement, the control element of the Lockheed standard
introduces a more complicated question about the overall
relationship between the OSP and the infringer.
Because much uncertainty in the case law lies in determining
what the knowledge requirement entails,22 the following discussion
will examine the element and its relationship to the control
element. This section will focus mainly on the Second, Fourth, and
Ninth Circuits as having produced notably conflicting standards.
A. The Knowledge Element and Willful Blindness
The knowledge element targets behavior that “designedly
enabl[es]” infringing activity23—which can include both passive
and active conduct. Courts tend to illustrate this element in terms
of what it is not. In Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d
Cir. 2010) (Tiffany II), the Second Circuit held that general notice
of infringement provided to the online auction site eBay was not
enough to satisfy Inwood.24 Rather, the service provider would
WL 3812079, *8–9 (S.D. Ohio July 22, 2013) (classifying email accounts as
services, and applying Inwood to Google as a service provider).
21
See Inwood Labs, Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982).
22
Rebecca Dunlevy, Internet Immunity: The Limits of Contributory
Trademark Infringement Against Online Service Providers, 22 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 927, 950 (2012) (noting that a split in the tests
used by the courts has resulted in differing standards for the level of knowledge
required).
23
William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 530 (1924).
24
See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir. 2010).
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need to have specific knowledge of individual acts of infringement,
such as the identities of particular infringing sellers.25 While this
approach points to a threshold level of knowledge, the only
guiding interpretation of “specific knowledge” it provides is
“contemporary knowledge of which particular listings are
infringing or will infringe in the future.”26 The key distinction
between passable “specific knowledge” and insufficient “general
knowledge” is the knowledge of particular infringement, as
opposed to background knowledge that infringement is happening.
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition puts forth an
alternate test, which extends contributory liability to defendants
who fail to take reasonable precautions against the infringing
activity where the infringement can be “reasonably anticipated.”27
However, courts have favored Inwood over this relaxed standard—
the District Court for the Southern District of New York explicitly
rejected such a relaxed standard in Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc.,
576 F. Supp. 2d 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (Tiffany I).28 This further
suggests that the knowledge element requires something more than
general knowledge.
In practice, the knowledge element provides a mechanism to
account for more passive forms of contributorily infringing
conduct. The Second Circuit and Seventh Circuit have expressly
indicated that “willful blindness,” defined as the deliberate failure
to investigate suspected wrongdoing,29 is an alternative way to
satisfy the element.30 Under this standard, intent to facilitate
infringement may be inferred from the defendant’s knowing
actions (or non-actions), such as the willful establishment of

25

See id. at 109.
Id. at 107.
27
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 27 (1995).
28
See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 510 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (“[N]either precedent nor policy supports Tiffany’s contention that
generalized allegations of infringement provide defendants with knowledge or a
reason to know of the infringement.”).
29
See Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d
1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1992).
30
See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir. 2010); Hard
Rock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1148.
26
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business conditions that are highly conducive to infringement.31 In
Hard Rock Cafe, the Seventh Circuit noted that in applying the
“willful blindness” approach, the district court should have focused
more on the defendant’s state of mind and less on its external
conduct (i.e., the defendant’s failure to take precautions against
infringing activity).32 However, plaintiffs need not prove express
intent.33
Overall, the knowledge element creates a threshold for
determining when a defendant should have taken affirmative action
against the infringement. Such action includes taking reasonable
corrective measures against individual instances of infringement
when notified.34 The Second Circuit held that eBay could not be
expected to police trademark infringement on its site. The court
found that eBay’s corrective measures were satisfactory, having
dealt with the specific instances of infringement actually brought
to its attention.35 The Seventh Circuit was also careful to point out
31

See Chloe SAS v. Sawabeh Info. Servs. Co, No. CV 11-04147 GAF
(MaNx), 2014 WL 4402218, at *22 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2014) (finding that
defendants’ actual awareness of each infringement did not matter where
defendants had “deliberately established a haven for trademark infringement and
counterfeiting”).
32
See Hard Rock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1149.
33
See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 658
F.3d 936, 943 (9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting the argument that contributory
infringement must be intentional); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508
F.3d 1146, 1172 (9th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that intent may be inferred from “a
service provider’s knowing failure to prevent infringing actions”).
34
The Second Circuit reasoned:
[A]lthough the NOCIs and buyer complaints gave eBay reason
to know that certain sellers had been selling counterfeits, those
sellers’ listings were removed and repeat offenders were
suspended from the eBay site. Thus Tiffany failed to
demonstrate that eBay was supplying its service to individuals
who it knew or had reason to know were selling counterfeit
Tiffany goods.
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir. 2010).
35
See id. at 109–10.
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that the knowledge requirement does not impose an affirmative
duty of action on service providers: “Although the ‘reason to
know’ part of the standard for contributory liability requires CSI
(or its agents) to understand what a reasonably prudent person
would understand, it does not impose any duty to seek out and
prevent violations.”36 However, once the service provider has
reason to suspect users of infringement, it may not “shield itself
from learning of the particular infringing transactions by looking
the other way.”37
B. Additional “Control” and the Dynamic OSP-User
Relationship
The Lockheed standard introduces an element of “direct control
and monitoring” in the relationship between the service provider
and the infringing user,38 which may be considered an addendum
to the knowledge element, or an altogether separate requirement.
This addition arises from the Ninth Circuit’s distinction between a
product and a service which would necessitate further
considerations of how much control a defendant has over an
infringer.39 Citing Hard Rock Cafe, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
in the case of a product, a manufacturer more clearly supplied
infringers with the instrumentality to infringe, whereas a closer
link was necessary to show contributory liability for service
providers.40
Unlike the basic Inwood knowledge requirement, this
heightened standard accounts more consistently for active conduct
by the defendant. It assesses not only a threshold for when the
defendant should take preventative action, but also when a
defendant may have been actively contributing to the infringement.
This is in accord with a reading of Inwood as containing not only a
“knows or has reason to know” element but also a “continues to
36

See Hard Rock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1149.
See Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 109.
38
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 984
(9th Cir. 1999).
39
See id.
40
See id.
37
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supply” element.41
Examples of courts applying the Lockheed standard show that
certain types of OSPs may inherently lack a clear link to infringing
uses of its services. Lockheed suggests that domain name registrars
are such a class, because the defendant performed only registering
services and had limited control.42 On the other hand, the court
suggested that an OSP that performs “hosting” functions, checks
for registrants’ rights to use particular words, or monitors the use
of domain names after registration might exert the appropriate
level of control.43 In Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Intern. Serv. Ass’n, the
Ninth Circuit also held that defendants did not have “direct
control” where their online payment systems were being used to
process payments for infringing material.44 The court suggested
that sufficient evidence of control would include a showing of
defendants’ “power to remove infringing material from [infringing
websites using the payment system] or directly stop their
distribution over the internet.”45
While the Second Circuit in Tiffany II found it unnecessary to
perform a “control” analysis for deciding whether the modified
Inwood standard applied to eBay,46 the district court had concluded
through applying a set of determining factors that eBay did exert
“significant control” over transactions and listings on its site.47
While this set of factors pertains specifically to eBay’s services,
scholars have recognized that they may be used generally in
determining an OSP’s degree of control over the infringing
instrumentality. The relevant points are: (1) the OSP’s degree of
control over the website’s software and what type of service it
provides; (2) the OSP’s use of plaintiff’s mark to promote its
41

Inwood Labs, Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982).
See Lockheed Martin, 194 F.3d at 984.
43
See id. at 982.
44
See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Intern. Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 807 (9th
Cir. 2007).
45
Id.
46
See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 105–06 (2d Cir. 2010).
47
See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 505–07
(S.D.N.Y. 2008).
42
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website; (3) economic benefit the OSP derives through the use of
plaintiff’s mark; (4) the OSP’s control over specific features of the
website; and (5) exceptions for nominative uses of plaintiff’s mark
(such as use for describing products).48
Some scholars have noted that, given the disparity between
standards and the lack of a systematic approach in case law, there
is uncertainty about whether the additional “control” requirement
applies to a given OSP or whether the basic “knowledge”
requirement suffices.49 But the standards may be reconciled; both
focus on the nature of the relationship between the service provider
and the user.
The key inquiry is not necessarily about choosing one standard
over another, but rather understanding the nuances of this
relationship. In this sense, one major issue is whether the
infringing use of the OSP’s services is an isolated act or part of a
course of an ongoing or past relationship. For evidentiary
purposes, “isolated instances of fraud” are insufficient to show a
defendant’s complicity.50 However, the broader framework for the
“general vs. specific knowledge” concept suggests that a resolution
is not so simple.
Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2012)
(Rosetta Stone II) suggests that at least some question remains as
to whether contributory liability requires specific instances of
infringement or if a more general course of dealing is enough. The
case concerned language software company Rosetta Stone’s claim
that search engine Google was contributorily liable for the
infringing conduct of third party advertisers.51 The infringing
advertisers purchased Rosetta Stone’s marks through Google’s
keyword auction tool and subsequently used the marks in Google’s
48

See Lauren E. Sims, When Enough Control is Not Enough: The
Conflicting Standards of Secondary Liability in Rosetta Stone, 26 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 655, 681 (2011) (reformulating the five factors to account for general
characteristics of OSPs other than eBay).
49
See Dunlevy, supra note 22, at 950.
50
This is true at least in the context of manufacturers, but presumably also
service providers subject to Inwood. 4 LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK,
CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS & MONOPOLIES § 23:10
(4th ed. 2014).
51
See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 152 (4th Cir. 2012).
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sponsored links to direct users to counterfeit Rosetta Stone
products and competing products.52 Citing the Second Circuit’s
finding in Tiffany II that generalized knowledge was insufficient,
the district court held that Google did not apparently have specific
knowledge of the infringing activity.53 The Fourth Circuit vacated
the district court’s order granting summary judgment to Google,
concluding that there was at least a question of fact as to whether
Google knowingly continued to provide services to infringing
users. The Fourth Circuit relied on evidence provided before the
district court in Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d
531, 548 (E.D. Va. 2010) (Rosetta Stone I). This evidence included
a spreadsheet reflecting Rosetta Stone’s notifications to Google of
“approximately 200 instances of Sponsored Links advertising
counterfeit Rosetta Stone products.”54 Despite having received
such notice, “Google continued to allow Sponsored Links for other
websites by these same advertisers.”55
Although decided on a summary judgment standard, the Fourth
Circuit’s decision leaves open the possibility that contributory
liability applies not only to specific instances of infringement but
to relationships as a whole—that is, the pattern of behavior a user
establishes in the course of using the defendant’s services. The
concept of the ongoing relationship is novel in that it emphasizes
an infringer’s nature as a user of the services, rather than a
numerical threshold of specific instances (which tends to exclude
the more humanistic factors at play). While requiring less
specificity, such a standard is not likely to extend contributory
liability to findings of general knowledge, as established in Tiffany
II.56 It might, however, fall somewhere below the Lockheed
52

See id. at 151–52.
See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531, 548 (E.D.
Va. 2010).
54
Rosetta Stone, 676 F.3d at 163.
55
Id.
56
See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir. 2010)
(agreeing with the district court’s interpretation of Inwood as requiring “some
contemporary knowledge of which particular listings are infringing or will
infringe”).
53
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“control” standard and the Tiffany II “specific knowledge”
standard.
III.

THE BALANCING FACTORS OF GOOD FAITH AND
PRACTICABILITY

Whether any particular standard is viable and when it applies
may ultimately depend on certain balancing factors as indicated by
case law. Among these are the underlying policy interests of
trademark law, whether a defendant’s actions indicate good (or
bad) faith, and the inherent differences between OSPs.
A. Limiting a Trademark Holder’s Exclusive Rights with
“Control”
Trademark law balances an interest in protecting the mark of a
business or individual with a concern about improperly expanding
property rights. This is especially true where contributory
trademark infringement is concerned because the doctrine extends
liability beyond traditional cases of direct infringement. As such,
the imposition of an additional “control” requirement reflects an
attempt by courts to limit this expanding scope. In Lockheed, both
the Ninth Circuit57 and the district court noted this concern. The
district court asserted that “[t]he solution to the current difficulties
faced by trademark owners on the Internet lies in this sort of
technical innovation, not in attempts to assert trademark rights over
legitimate non-trademark uses of this important new means of
communication.”58
Some scholars have criticized this heightened standard, arguing
that it is an incorrect interpretation of the doctrine,59 or a somewhat
57

See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 984
(9th Cir. 1999) (“Direct control and monitoring of the instrumentality used by a
third party to infringe the plaintiff's mark permits the expansion of Inwood
Lab.’s ‘supplies a product’ requirement for contributory infringement.”).
58
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 968
(C.D. Cal. 1997).
59
See Dunlevy, supra note 22, at 958–59 (“The Ninth Circuit . . . fails to
fully reason out why this distinction is necessary based on the extension of
liability in Hard Rock Cafe and Fonovisa to landlords and licensors.”).
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redundant addition to a knowledge standard which is already
difficult to satisfy.60 However, scholars have also pointed out that
the “control” element “recognizes the distance at which OSPs and
third parties transact and the difficulty with requiring OSPs to
personally monitor every use of their services,” in comparison to
real world business models.61 As such, the value of a “control”
requirement cannot easily be discounted, nor can the likelihood
that courts will continue to apply it.
B. Potential Benefits to the Service Provider
A “good faith” analysis may be split into two parts: the
circumstantial role of economic incentives to the defendant, and
actual preventative measures taken by the defendant. As shown in
the standard of “willful blindness,” an important rationale behind
contributory trademark infringement is preventing service
providers from abetting infringing activity where they have
economic incentives to do so. Again, this reflects the doctrine’s
origins in tort and unfair competition law.
Given the nature of the relationship between certain types of
OSPs and users, OSPs often have significant incentives to aid
infringement or turn a blind eye. For example, as the Second
Circuit noted in Rosetta Stone II, Google profited from clicks on its
sponsored links and thus had incentives to allow activities that
would increase traffic or otherwise promote its website.62
Similarly, in Tiffany I, the district court considered the question of
economic benefit among the factors for determining eBay’s degree
of control over the instrumentality for infringement.63 Further
60

See Sims, supra note 48, at 663 (“[O]ne might argue that an element of
‘control’ is already incorporated into the knowledge standard, which serves to
mitigate the level of liability: if OSPs function predominantly through
automated processes, then they likely have little human knowledge of how third
parties are specifically using their services.”).
61
Id. at 679.
62
See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 151 (4th Cir. 2012).
63
See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 505–07
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting, specifically, eBay’s promotion of its website using the
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factors that may be relevant are the strength of the economic
incentive and the plausibility of defendant’s allegedly contributory
actions without the incentive.
It should be noted, however, that economic benefit alone is
insufficient for a finding of contributory infringement.64
C. The Feasibility of Preventative Measures
Because OSPs function through automated processes, they will
have little direct knowledge of what individual users are doing.
This presents an obstacle both for plaintiffs who must demonstrate
that such an OSP “knew or had reason to know” of infringement,
and OSPs looking towards more aggressive policies against
trademark infringement. As the district court reasoned in
Lockheed, a domain name registrar cannot be expected to “monitor
the Internet.”65
Courts may then weigh any economic incentive against any
mitigating actions by the service provider. For example, in Tiffany
II, the Second Circuit emphasized eBay’s corrective actions in
response to notifications of infringing listings in finding that it did
not contributorily infringe.66 Conversely, although the district court
in Rosetta Stone I found that Google took some measures to
prevent infringing uses of keywords,67 the Fourth Circuit appeared
to take greater notice of the fact that Google continued allowing
infringing activity by users after being notified about the users.68
While this factor should not undercut any duties for OSPs
Tiffany mark).
64
See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531, 548 (E.D.
Va. 2010).
65
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 962
(C.D. Cal. 1997).
66
See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir. 2010).
67
See Rosetta Stone, 730 F. Supp. 2d at 548 (reasoning that because Google
had no mechanism for detecting specific infringement, there was little it could
do besides prohibiting advertisements for counterfeits, notifying users of their
responsibilities, and taking down individual advertisements when notified of
infringement).
68
See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 163–64 (4th Cir.
2012).
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implied under the “knowledge” or “control” standards, courts may
be willing to recognize when an OSP has done everything it could
be reasonably expected to do in light of practical or economic
limitations.69
D. Recognizing Inherent Differences Between OSPs
Because each OSP is different, there may not be a single test
that is applicable to all of them.70 In deciding exactly when OSPs
have satisfied their burden, it may be useful to examine the specific
nature of the individual OSP on a case-by-case basis. While this
factor might indicate the degree of control an OSP has over user
activity, this information alone may not reveal much about whether
the OSP has satisfied its burdens. As such, it should be considered
only in light of the overall standard being applied, and the factors
described above.
Based on a review of the case law, several characteristics of
OSPs stand out as particularly important.71 First, what type of
service does the OSP provide, e.g., name registering, payment
processing, online marketplace? Second, did the OSP itself create
or post the infringing material, e.g., using an algorithm-based
program? Third, does the infringing material appear within the
OSP’s own domain, e.g., on its web page? Finally, does the OSP
facilitate the transactions within which the infringement takes
place? If so, how—directly (by handling payments, like eBay) or
other ways (via click-throughs, like Google)? In some instances,
such as claims against domain name registrars, these
individualized characteristics may affect a plaintiff’s chance of
success.
69

This factor is subject to two divergent interpretations: “industry standard”
feasibility (i.e., which measures are reasonable relative to similar OSPs, taken in
light of general practice standards) and literal, “state of the art” feasibility (i.e.,
which measures are possible given the technological environment in which the
OSP operates). As can be seen in the case law examined in this Article, U.S.
courts appear to favor the former at this point in time.
70
See Sims, supra note 48, at 676–77.
71
These incorporate some of the Tiffany elements.
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CONCLUSION
The current challenge facing courts and online proprietors is
determining the balance between controlling trademark infringing
behavior and having to police activity beyond one’s control.
Case law indicates that, while narrow, contributory liability
standards may expand beyond situations in which web hosts have
knowledge of specific instances of infringement. Balancing factors
in the OSP-user relationship and considerations of good faith and
legal doctrine must be taken into account to accommodate newer
developments in the types of online exchanges available to service
providers and their users.
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PRACTICE POINTERS


Analyze the balancing factors of good faith and the
limitation of exclusive rights in light of the overall
standard.



If necessary, address the specific nature of the OSP’s
service(s), and consider the degree of control the OSP has
over user activity.



Understand the nature of the relationship between the OSP
and the infringing user—e.g., is the infringement ongoing
or habitual, or is it an isolated act?



When advising a trademark holder: provide detailed notice
to OSPs of individual acts of infringement whenever
possible. Consider ways to give related OSPs notice of
“repeat offenders” when these OSPs are likely to be
involved.



When advising an OSP: ensure timely and effective
responses to notifications of infringement.
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